A theory of revealed indirect preference by HU, Gaoji et al.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics 
1-2021 
A theory of revealed indirect preference 
Gaoji HU 
Jiangtao LI 
John K.-H. QUAH 
Rui TANG 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research 
 Part of the Economic Theory Commons 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional 
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School 
Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For 
more information, please email cherylds@smu.edu.sg. 
A Theory of Revealed Indirect Preference∗
Gaoji Hu† Jiangtao Li‡ John K.-H. Quah§ Rui Tang¶
January 30, 2021
Abstract
A preference over menus is said to be an indirect preference if it is induced
by a preference over the objects that make up those menus, i.e., a menu A
is ranked over B whenever A contains an object that is preferred to every
object in B. The basic question we address in this paper is the following:
suppose an observer has partial information of an agent’s ranking over certain
menus; what necessary and sufficient conditions on those rankings guarantee
the existence of a preference over objects that induces the observed menu
rankings? Our basic result has a wide variety of applications. (1) It gives
a characterization of rankings over prices that could be extended to a bona
fide indirect utility function. (2) It leads to a generalization of Afriat’s (1967)
theorem that allows for imperfectly observed choices. (3) It could be used
to characterize observations that are consistent with a multiple preferences
model. (4) It leads to a characterization of a model of choice generated by
minimax regret.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the structure of indirect preference. Given a set of alternatives
X, we refer to nonempty subsets of X as menus. A preference over menus constitutes
an indirect preference so long as there is a preference over the alternatives in X such
that menu A is preferred to another menu B whenever A contains an object that is
preferred to every object in B.
The study of indirect preferences has a long history in economic theory. Indeed, a
basic question in consumer theory concerns the recovery of the direct utility function
(defined on bundles of ` goods) from the indirect utility over the prices of those
goods. In this case, plainly, a vector of prices (with income held fixed at some
value) corresponds to a linear budget set, which is just a specific type of menu from
the consumption space X = R`+. It is well-known that the crucial property that
makes it possible for a function defined over prices to be a bona fide indirect utility
function is for it to be quasiconvex in prices (see Krishna and Sonnenschein (1990)
and Jackson (1986)).
This question could be posed in a more general form that is not specific to the
consumer theory context. Kreps (1979) considers all possible menus drawn from a
set of alternatives X and shows that a preference over these menus constitutes an
indirect preference if and only if it satisfies the following property: if an agent prefers
menu A to B, then he is indifferent between A and A ∪B.1 Tyson (2018) extends
this result by characterizing indirect preference defined over a given subcollection
of menus; note that Tyson’s result is also related to the classical result on indirect
utility functions since the latter induces a preference defined over all linear budget
sets, which forms a subcollection of menus among all possible menus drawn from
the space of consumption bundles X = R`+.






. At each observation t, the observer knows that
the agent weakly prefers menu At to Bt; and for a (possibly empty) subcollection S
of those observations, the observer knows that At is strictly preferred to Bt for each
t ∈ S. We say that the data setM can be rationalized if the observed preference
between each pair of menus is part of an indirect preference, i.e., there exists a
preference over the space of alternatives X such that At is (strictly) preferred to Bt
if and only if At contains an alternative that is (strictly) better than each alternative
1 Kreps (1979) uses this as a benchmark for the axiomatization of preference for flexibility.
Other models of menu preferences include (among others) Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001),
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), and Dekel and Lipman (2012).
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in Bt.
Our fundamental result establishes that a data set M can be rationalized if
and only if it satisfies the never-covered property; this is an intuitive property that
could be defined via an iterative procedure. As a simple example of what it entails,
suppose the observer knows that the agent strictly prefers menu A to B and weakly
prefers A′ to B′. Since there is an alternative in A that strictly dominates everything
in B, a necessary condition for rationalization is that B does not contain A, i.e.,
A \B 6= ∅. But this is not all. We also need to check if A′ ⊆ B; if this holds, then
clearly there is some element in A that dominates every element in B ∪B′ and so
A \ (B ∪B′) must also be nonempty. In other words, some element must remain in
A after all of A’s revealed dominated elements have been iteratively excluded; this
property turns out to be both necessary and sufficient for rationalization.
Note that the setting of our result is different from that of Kreps (1979), Tyson
(2018), or the characterization results on indirect utility over prices. In those papers,
it is assumed that the observer knows the complete ranking over the collection of
menus under consideration. On the other hand, our result allows the observer to
have only an incomplete ranking over menus; for example, the observer need not
know the agent’s preference between menus At and At′ . The never-covered property
reduces to the properties found in the earlier papers if the set of observations leads
to a complete ranking over the collection of menus being considered.
Another paper that is closely related to ours is that of Fishburn (1976). That
paper studies a different rationalizability problem (which is closely connected to
the issue of coarse rationalizability discussed below), but its basic result could also
be interpreted as a result on preference over menus; interpreted in that way, it
provides a characterization of indirect preference (through a property called the
partial congruence axiom) in the special case where At is strictly preferred to Bt for
each t ∈ T . Our never-covered property is a generalization of the partial congruence
axiom that allows for the possibility that the observer only knows that one menu is
weakly preferred to another. This generalization is nontrivial and it is also crucial in
certain applications, including the application to coarse rationalizability discussed
below.
In some applications, it may not suffice to have a preference onX that rationalizes
a data setM; it may also be desirable to have the preference be the extension of
some given preorder. For example, in the case of consumer theory, it would be
natural to require any rationalizing preference to be increasing in the product order
on the consumption space X = R`+. In cases where the space of alternatives X, and
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the menus defined on it, contain infinitely many elements, it is also natural to assume
that there is a topology on X and to require preferences over X to be continuous,
which guarantees the existence of optimal elements when menus are compact. We
show that our basic result can be extended to incorporate these features. Last but
not least, we show that the never-covered property can be verified via an efficient
algorithm, which facilitates the empirical application of our results.
The paper also discusses four applications of our theory.
(1) First, we revisit the question of characterizing indirect utility over prices. Instead
of assuming that the entire indirect utility function is known, we assume that the
observer only knows the consumer’s preference for a finite set of price pairs, i.e.,
pt is preferred to qt (for t = 1, 2, . . . , T ), with income normalized at 1. We show
that there is an increasing, continuous and concave utility function that rationalizes
the observed price preferences provided the latter satisfies a generalization of the
quasi-convex property (on indirect utility functions). In the case in which pt is
strictly preferred to qt for all t, the condition says the following: for any nonempty
subset T ′ of observations, there exists some t′ ∈ T ′ such that no q in the convex hull
of {qs}s∈T ′ is weakly less than pt
′ .
(2) Consider a data set with T observations; at each observation t, it is observed
that an agent chooses xt from the menu Ct. Various versions of Afriat’s theorem
(1967)2 answer the following question: what necessary and sufficient conditions on
O = {(xt, Ct)}t∈T guarantee the existence of a utility function U defined on X
such that xt ∈ arg maxx∈Ct U(x) for all observations t. Afriat’s Theorem assumes
that an observer knows precisely the choice made by the agent, but there are many
scenarios where the observation is coarse, in the sense that the agent’s choice cannot
be precisely pinned down to xt, but is known simply to come from a subset of Ct.
For instance, suppose that goods are categorized into several categories, and the
observer only knows the consumer’s total spending on each category of goods at
each observation. In this case, the observer will be able to infer that the consumer
is choosing from a set At ⊆ Ct but not the precise choice itself. Another possibility
is that the observations are known to be imperfect; even though yt is the recorded
choice, one may then wish to have a more permissive check of rationalization where
the true choice is allowed to deviate from yt in a limited way.
These scenarios are formally captured by specifying an observation as (At, Ct),
2 See, for example, Varian (1982), Forges and Minelli (2009), Reny (2015), and Nishimura,
OK, and Quah (2017). For a textbook treatment of the Afriat’s theorem, see Kreps (2013) and
Chambers and Echenique (2016).
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where At ⊆ Ct contains the agent’s choice. The corresponding rationalization
condition requires that there be a utility function U and xt such that xt ∈ At and
xt ∈ arg maxx∈Ct U(x) for all observations t. Notice that this is equivalent to the
condition that (considered as menus) At is weakly preferred to Ct for all t. It follows
that the never-covered property could be used to characterize rationalizable data
sets and our algorithm provides a practical way of checking for this property in
empirical applications.3
The last two applications of our theory provide characterizations of choice models
outside the classical paradigm.
(3) In the multiple preferences model (Aizerman and Malishevski, 1981; Salant and
Rubinstein, 2008), an agent’s choice from a menu C could be the optimal choice for
any one of a set of preferences. The question we pose is the following: suppose that
for a finite collection of menus Ct we observe the agent’s choices from each menu,
which we denote by At; when can we find a collection of preferences {%i}i∈I such
that Zt = At, where Zt consists of all elements of Ct that are optimal according to
some preference %′ in {%i}i∈I ? It turns out that this problem can be reformulated
as a problem of rationalizing menu preferences and thus could be solved with a
version of the never-covered property. Our result generalizes the finding in Aizerman
and Malishevski (1981), who address this issue in the case where the choice set from
every possible menu is observed.
(4) The second model we consider is the minimax regret model (Wald, 1950; Savage,
1951). In this model, an agent has multiple utility functions over alternatives, drawn
from a set U . For a given menu C, the regret of alternative x under one of the
agent’s utility functions u ∈ U is given by u(x)−maxy∈A u(y). The agent evaluates
alternative x according to its maximal regret maxu∈U (u(x)−maxy∈A u(y)), and
chooses alternatives from the choice set that minimize the maximal regret. Using the
never-covered property once again, we could find necessary and sufficient conditions
on a data set under which the set of choices at each observed menu coincides exactly
with the set of model consistent choices, for an appropriately chosen U .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set out the
notations that are used throughout the paper. In Section 3, we introduce the main
3 Fishburn (1976) considers a related problem where he requires arg maxx∈Ct U(x) ⊆ At for all
observations t. This is equivalent to requiring the menu At to be strictly preferred to Ct \At for all
t. We think that our formulation of rationalizability is more appropriate in empirical applications;
unlike Fishburn’s formulation, we allow for the possibility that an alternative in Ct \ At is also
optimal for the agent and it is the natural generalization of the rationalizability notion in Afriat’s
Theorem, which does allow for the optimality of alternatives in Ct \ {xt}.
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theorem, discuss several of its special cases, and also formulate the algorithm to
test the never-covered property. The four applications of our theory are presented
(respectively) in Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7. All omitted proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
We work with a fixed nonempty set X, which can be viewed as the universal set of
alternatives. Let X denote the collection of nonempty subsets of X. We refer to
elements of X as menus. Generic elements of X are denoted by x, y, z, etc, while
generic elements of X are denoted by A, B, C, etc.
A preorder D on X is a binary relation on X that is reflexive and transitive.4
We use B to denote the asymmetric part of D. For a given preorder D on X and
a set A ∈ X , we define A↓ to be the decreasing closure of A with respect to the
preorder D, i.e.,
A↓ := {x ∈ X : y D x for some y ∈ A},
and define A↓↓ to be the strictly decreasing closure of A with respect to the preorder
D, i.e.,
A↓↓ := {x ∈ X : y B x for some y ∈ A}.
We write max(A; D) := A \ A↓↓ to denote the set of D-undominated alternatives in
A.
A preference % on X is a complete preorder on X. We use  to denote the
asymmetric part of %. If  is anti-symmetric, then we call  a strict preference. We
say that x is a %-maximal element in A if x ∈ A and x % y for all y ∈ A, and write
max(A; %) to denote the set of %-maximal alternatives in A. When convenient, we
write x % A if x % y for each y ∈ A and x  A if x  y for each y ∈ A.
Oftentimes, it is useful to study preferences restricted to a particular class. We
say that the preference % extends the preorder D if
x % y whenever x D y, and x  y whenever xB y.
4 Terminology: a binary relation R on X is a nonempty subset of X ×X, but as usual, we
write xRy instead of (x, y) ∈ R. We say that R is reflexive if xRx for each x ∈ X, transitive if
xRyRz implies xRz for each x, y, z ∈ X, complete if either xRy or yRx holds for any x, y ∈ X,
and anti-symmetric if for any x, y ∈ X such that x 6= y, xRy and yRx do not hold simultaneously.
The asymmetric part of R is defined as the binary relation P on X such that xPy if and only if
xRy but not yRx.
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We can think of D as an exogenously given dominance relation on X, and view the
statement x D y as saying that x is an objectively better alternative than y, which
the individual’s preference % should respect.
The general choice environment we have defined here broadly follows that in
Nishimura, OK, and Quah (2017). As a basic example of this environment, we note
that in consumer theory, the consumption space with n commodities is typically
X = Rn+ and it is common to assume that a consumer would always strictly prefer
to have more of any good. In this case, the consumer’s preference would extend
the coordinatewise ordering ≥ on Rn+.5 Bear in mind that this setup allows for an
arbitrary preference without a preorder restriction, since this can be thought of as
the case in which the preference extends the trivial preorder D where x D y if and
only if x = y.
3 Rationalizability of menu preferences
In this section, we study the conditions under which a finite list of observed menu
preference pairs collected from an agent is consistent with some (unobserved)
preference on the underlying alternatives. The data collected by the observer





, where T is a nonempty finite index
set and At and Bt are menus. For each t, the observer either knows that the agent
weakly prefers At to Bt or that the agent strictly prefers At to Bt.6 Let W be
the collection of observations where At is weakly preferred to Bt, and let S be the
collection of observations where At is strictly preferred to Bt. By definition, {W,S}
is a partition of T . For any nonempty T ′ ⊆ T , we let
A(T ′) := ⋃t∈T ′ At and B(T ′) := ⋃t∈T ′ Bt.
The following definition specifies precisely what it means forM to be rationalized.






a preference % on X if for any t ∈ T , there exists xt ∈ At such that
(1) xt % Bt and
(2) xt  Bt if t ∈ S.
5 Formally, x ≥ y if and only if xi ≥ yi for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and x > y if and only if
x ≥ y and xi > yi for some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. We write x  y if and only if xi > yi for each
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
6 This formulation includes the case in which the observer knows that the agent is indifferent
between two menus (say) A and B, because this case could be considered as two observations, with
the agent weakly preferring A to B in one observation and B to A in the other observation.
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In this case, we say that M is rationalizable. We say that a preference %
D-rationalizes M if % rationalizes M and extends D; in this case, M is D-
rationalizable.7






which can be D-rationalized. Readers familiar with the revealed
preference theory will notice that the issue is fairly straightforward when At is a
singleton for each t. In that case, the problem is (in its essentials) within the scope
of the well-known theorems of Afriat (1967) and Richter (1966) and their extensions;
in the manner of those theorems, some version of a no-cycling condition on the
revealed preference relations defined on {xt}t∈T (which will be stated formally later
in Definition 3) is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a preference that
extends D and satisfies (1) and (2) in Definition 1.8 Of course, At is typically not
a singleton. Thus, we could understand the issue before us in the following way:
we have to formulate a property onM that guarantees the existence of a selection





satisfies the required no-cycling condition. The next subsection provides the property
guaranteeing that such a selection exists.
3.1 The never-covered property





is D-rationalized by some preference
relation %. Consider an arbitrary observation t. By the definition of D-
rationalizability, At contains an alternative x with x % Bt. Since % extends
D, x /∈ Bt↓↓. Moreover, if t ∈ S, then At contains an alternative x with x  Bt and
so x /∈ Bt↓. Thus At cannot be covered by Bt↓↓ if t ∈ W , and cannot be covered by
Bt
↓ if t ∈ S.
7 Definition 1 is one of several possible formulations of the rationalizability of a set of menu
preference pairs. For example, one could require that for any t ∈ T , (1) for any y ∈ Bt, there
exists x ∈ At such that x  y and (2) there exists xt ∈ At such that xt  Bt if t ∈ S. To see the
(subtle) differences between these two formulations, suppose that the preorder is ≥. The first data
set has only one observation (B,B) where B = (0, 1) and the relation is weak. The second data
set has only one observation (A,B) where A is the set of rational numbers in (0, 1), B = (0, 1),
and the relation is weak. Definition 1 would classify both data sets as not ≥-rationalizable, while
the alternative formulation would classify both as ≥-rationalizable. That being said, in all the
applications that we study (and in most economic environments), either X is fine or X is infinite
but the menus are compact. In these cases, these two formulations are equivalent.
8 To be precise, Nishimura, OK, and Quah (2017) already provides a condition on{
({xt}, Bt)
}
t∈T that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a preference % that extends D
and satisfies xt % Bt for each t ∈ T . In our case, we potentially have observations where we require
xt  Bt; thus a modification of the condition in Nishimura, OK, and Quah (2017) is required to
accommodate these cases, but this extension of their result is fairly straightforward.
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This argument could be generalized to more than one observation. For any
nonempty subset T ′ ⊆ T , notice that (1) if x satisfies x % B(T ′) then x /∈ B(T ′)↓↓;
and (2) if x satisfies x  B(T ′ ∩ S) then x /∈ B(T ′ ∩ S)↓. Thus, if A(T ′) contains
an alternative x̂ satisfying both conditions, then A(T ′) cannot be covered by
B(T ′)↓↓⋃B(T ′ ∩ S)↓. Indeed, we can find such an alternative x̂ in A(T ′): for
each t ∈ T ′, pick xt ∈ At such that xt % Bt if t ∈ W and xt  Bt if t ∈ S; then let
x̂ = max({xt}t∈T ′ ;%) ∈ A(T ′).
We are now ready to introduce the procedure that we call the iterated exclusion of
dominated observations. Given a nonempty subset of observations T ′, let Φ0(T ′) :=
∅, and let Φ1(T ′) be the collection of observations t such that At is covered by
B(T ′)↓↓⋃B(T ′ ∩ S)↓, i.e.,
Φ1(T ′) :=
{
t ∈ T ′ : At ⊆ B(T ′)↓↓
⋃
B(T ′ ∩ S)↓
}
.
We know there is x̂ ∈ A(T ′) such that x̂ % B(T ′) and x̂  B(T ′ ∩ S). Then, x̂  At
for each t ∈ Φ1(T ′) and, since At is preferred to Bt, we obtain that x̂  Bt↓ for each
t ∈ Φ1(T ′). Thus, x̂  B((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φ1(T ′))↓. Obviously, A(T ′) cannot be covered
by B(T ′)↓↓⋃B((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φ1(T ′))↓. Let
Φ2(T ′) :=
{
t ∈ T ′ : At ⊆ B(T ′)↓↓
⋃
B((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φ1(T ′))↓
}
.
Note that Φ1(T ′) ⊆ Φ2(T ′). By a similar argument, we know that if t ∈ Φ2(T ′)
then x̂  Bt↓ and consequently, A(T ′) cannot be covered by B(T ′)↓↓⋃B((T ′ ∩ S) ∪
Φ2(T ′))↓. We may repeat this argument for m = 2, 3, . . . , where
Φm+1(T ′) :=
{
t ∈ T ′ : At ⊆ B(T ′)↓↓
⋃
B((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φm(T ′))↓
}
.
Since Φm(T ′) is an increasing sequence in m in the set inclusion sense and the
data set is finite, the procedure stops at m∗ when Φm∗(T ′) = Φm∗+1(T ′). Let
Φ(T ′) := Φm∗(T ′); we refer to Φ(T ′) as the set of revealed dominated observations (or
simply dominated observations) in T ′. Since B(T ′)↓↓⋃B((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φ(T ′))↓ cannot
contain x̂, it does not cover A(T ′). In other words, Φ(T ′) is a strict subset of T ′.





satisfies the never-covered property under D if,
for any nonempty T ′ ⊆ T , the set of revealed dominated observations Φ(T ′) satisfies
Φ(T ′) 6= T ′.
We have shown that the never-covered property under D is a necessary condition
















Figure 1: (a) The data setM = {(Kp, Kq)), (Kq, Kr)}, where both relations are
weak, is not ≥-rationalizable; (b) the data set M̂ = {(K̂p, K̂q)), (K̂q, K̂r)}, where
both relations are weak, is ≥-rationalizable.
shows that it is also sufficient. The example below illustrates how we can use the
never-covered property under D to test the D-rationalizability of a set of menu
preference pairs.
Example 1. Consider the classic model of consumer demand with two goods. We
take the preorder to be the coordinatewise ordering ≥ on X = R2+. Figure 1(a)
depicts linear budget sets, Kp, Kq, and Kr. Figure 1(b) depicts linear budget sets,
K̂p, K̂q, and K̂r.9
Suppose that M consists of two observations, (Kp, Kq) and (Kq, Kr), where
both relations are weak. We claim that M is not ≥-rationalizable. Suppose to
the contrary that M is ≥-rationalizable, say, by a preference relation %. Then,
there exists at least one bundle x̂ contained in Kp ∪ Kq such that x̂ % Kq ∪ Kr.
Since Kq ∪ Kr = Kp ∪ Kq ∪ Kr, the bundle x̂ is %-maximal in Kp ∪ Kq ∪ Kr.
However, any %-maximal alternative in Kp ∪ Kq ∪ Kr cannot be in Kp since (i)
% extends ≥; and (ii) Kp is covered by (Kq ∪Kr)o.10 Furthermore, x̂ cannot be
contained in Kq either; otherwise, there would be some y ∈ Kp such that y % x̂ and
thus y is %-maximal in Kp ∪Kq ∪Kr, which is a contradiction. Notice that our
argument corresponds precisely to a violation of the never-covered property under ≥
for T ′ = T . Since B(T )↓↓⋃B(T ′ ∩ S)↓ = (Kq ∪Kr)o covers Kp, Φ1(T ) contains the
9 The 45 degree line in Figure 1(b) will be used in Example 4.
10 For any set K, we use Ko to denote its interior.
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observation (Kp, Kq). Since Kq ⊆ B(Φ1(T )), Kq ⊆ B(T )↓↓⋃B((T ∩ S) ∪ Φ1(T ))↓
and Φ2(T ) = T . Thus, Φ(T ) = T .
On the other hand, the data set M̂ = {(K̂p, K̂q)), (K̂q, K̂r)}, where both relations
are weak, is ≥-rationalizable. The optimal bundle in each set must be x∗, and it is
easy to check that the set Φ(T ) is empty.
3.2 The basic result
Our proof of the sufficiency of the never-covered property under D in guaranteeing
the D-rationalizability ofM proceeds by explicitly providing a way of selecting xt in
At for each t such that there exists a preference % on X that extends D and satisfies
(1) xt % Bt for all t ∈ T and (2) xt  Bt for t ∈ S (see Definition 1). Suppose that
we have selected xt from At for each t in some way. How do we check whether there
exists a preference with the required conditions? This can be characterized by a
no-cycling property which we now explain.
Let Y = {xt}t∈T . For xt and xt
′ in Y , we say that xt is revealed preferred to xt′
and denote it by xtRxt′ if xt′ ∈ Bt↓, and we say that xt is revealed strictly preferred
to xt′ and denote it by xt P xt′ if either (i) xt′ ∈ Bt↓↓ or (ii) t ∈ S and xt′ ∈ Bt↓.
The following is a no-cycling condition on the binary relations R and P .





, a selection xt from At for each
t ∈ T is a no-cycling selection under D if the revealed preference relations R and
P obey the following no-cycling property: there does not exist xt1, xt2 . . . , xtn in
{xt}t∈T such that
xt1 Rxt2 R · · ·Rxtn and xtn P xt1 . (1)
To see why this could be a plausible characterization, note that it is plainly a
necessary condition. Indeed, suppose the preference % extends D and, with this
preference, xt satisfies (1) xt % Bt for all t ∈ T and (2) xt  Bt for t ∈ S. If
xt is revealed preferred to xt′ , then by definition, xt % y D xt′ for some y ∈ Bt;
since % extends D and % is transitive, we obtain xt % xt′ . If xt is revealed strictly
preferred to xt′ , then we have either (i) xt % yBxt′ for some y ∈ Bt or (ii) t ∈ S and
xt  y D xt′ for some y ∈ Bt; in both cases, we may conclude that xt  xt′ . Given
the transitivity of %, we plainly cannot have xt1 , xt2 . . . , xtn in {xt}t∈T satisfying
(1).
We have just shown that if a data set of menu preference pairs is D-rationalizable,
then it admits a no-cycling selection under D. Theorem 1 below states that the
11
converse is also true and that both are equivalent to the never-covered property
under D.






preorder D, the following statements are equivalent:
1. M is D-rationalizable.
2. M satisfies the never-covered property under D.
3. M admits a no-cycling selection under D.
We end this subsection by providing a different formulation of the never-covered
property under D. The never-covered property under D implies that for any
nonempty T ′ ⊆ T , there exists some Φ ( T ′ such that for any t ∈ T ′ \ Φ, At 6⊆
B(T ′)↓↓⋃B((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φ)↓. To see this, we could simply set Φ = Φ(T ′). The
following proposition shows that the converse is also true.






1. For any nonempty T ′ ⊆ T , if there exists Φ ( T ′ such that for any t ∈ T ′ \ Φ,
At 6⊆ B(T ′)↓↓
⋃
B((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φ)↓,
then Φ(T ′) ⊆ Φ.
2. If for any nonempty T ′ ⊆ T , there exists Φ ( T ′ such that for any t ∈ T ′ \ Φ,
At 6⊆ B(T ′)↓↓
⋃
B((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φ)↓,
thenM satisfies the never-covered property under D.
3.3 Algorithm
Given a subset T ′, it is straightforward to check whether Φ(T ′) = T ′. Thus,
Theorem 1 provides us with a way of checking if a set of menu preference pairs is
D-rationalizable: we need to check whether Φ(T ′) 6= T ′ for all T ′ ⊆ T . This may not
seem promising as an empirical procedure, since for a data set with n observations,
we would have to go through all 2n − 1 nonempty subsets of T to guarantee the
D-rationalizability of that set. In this subsection, we provide a simple algorithm to
check whether the never-covered property under D holds. This algorithm requires
us to check whether Φ(T ′) 6= T ′ for at most n subsets of T . Thus, the never-covered
property under D can be checked in an efficient manner.
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Following the convention in the computer science literature, we use k′ to denote
the updated value of a variable k.
Algorithm. Set T 0 := T . Set k := 1.
Start. Derive T k := Φ(T k−1). Consider the following three mutually exclusive
cases:
(a). T k = ∅.
Stop and output D-Rationalizable.
(b). ∅ 6= T k ( T k−1.
Go to Start with k′ = k + 1.
(c). ∅ 6= T k = T k−1.
Stop and output Not D-Rationalizable.
Note that the Algorithm is effectively checking whether Φ(T k) = T k for an
endogenous sequence of subsets of T . We emphasize that, for a data set with n
observations, the Algorithm necessarily terminates within n steps, and we only
need to check at most n subsets of T .
Proposition 2 below provides the justification for this Algorithm.






rationalizable if and only if the Algorithm outputs D-Rationalizable.
3.4 Nice rationalization when D is trivial
The analysis in the previous subsections holds for any preorder D and any partition
{W,S} of T . In this subsection, we focus on the important special case in which the
rationalizing preference is not required to extend any given preorder or, put another
way, the preorder D is simply the trivial preorder where x D y if and only if x = y.






nonempty.11 Since D is trivial, A↓ = A and A↓↓ = ∅ for all A. Thus, the procedure
of iterated exclusion of dominated observations reduces to the following: for any
nonempty T ′ ⊆ T ,
Φ1(T ′) =
{





t ∈ T ′ : At ⊆ B ((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φm(T ′))
}
, for m = 1, 2, . . . .
11 If D is trivial, then any data set such that S = ∅ is rationalizable (by the preference relation
that the DM is indifferent among all alternatives).
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This iteration must stop at some point, i.e., there is m∗ such that Φm∗(T ′) =
Φm∗+1(T ′). The set of dominated observations is Φ(T ′) := Φm∗(T ′). By definition,
M satisfies the never-covered property under the trivial preorder if Φ(T ′) 6= T ′
for all nonempty T ′ ⊆ T . For the sake of brevity, we would simply refer toM as
satisfying the never-covered property, if it satisfies the never-covered property under
the trivial preorder.
The following example is a simple illustration of the application of Theorem 1
and the Algorithm to this setting.
Example 2. Let X = {x, y, z, r, w} and suppose that D is trivial. The data setM
consists of the following observations:
A1 = {x, y}, B1 = {z, r, w};
A2 = {y, z}, B2 = {x, r, w};
A3 = {x, r}, B3 = {y, z, w}; and
A4 = {r, w}, B4 = {z}.
where A1 is strictly preferred to B1 and the other relations are weak. In this case,
T = {1, 2, 3, 4} and S = {1}. Since A4 ⊆ B1, we obtain Φ1(T ) = {4}. Since
B1 ∪B4 = B1, Φ2(T ) = {4}, and thus Φ(T ) = {4}. The Algorithm now directs
us to calculate Φ({4}); this set is empty and so the Algorithm concludes thatM
is rationalizable. And indeed it is: for example, the preference x ∼ y  r ∼ w ∼ z
rationalizesM.
The following definition imposes a stronger notion of rationalizability than the
one provided in Definition 1 because the preference % is required to have an optimum
in every menu in the list of observations.






rationalized by a preference % on X if for all t ∈ T , max(At; %) and max(Bt; %)
are nonempty, and for any xt ∈ max(At; %) and yt ∈ max(Bt; %), we have (1)
xt % yt and (2) xt  yt if t ∈ S. In this case, we say thatM is nicely rationalizable.
A preference % nicely D-rationalizesM if % nicely rationalizesM and extends D;
in this case, we say thatM is nicely D-rationalizable.
In general, it is possible for a preference to rationalize a data set without it being
a nice rationalization. Of course, this cannot happen when X is finite, since the
existence of an optimum given a preference is then guaranteed. The next result says
that it cannot happen when the preorder is trivial either, in the sense that every
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data set that is rationalizable (by some preference) is also nicely rationalizable (by
a possibly different preference).







1. M is rationalizable.
2. M satisfies the never-covered property.
3. M is nicely rationalizable.
Example 3. As an illustration of Theorem 2, consider the case in which the data
set consists of just one observation: A1 = {1}, B1 = (0, 1), with A1 strictly preferred
to B1. Can this data set be rationalized by a preference that extends the standard
total order ≥ on R? Clearly, such a rationalization exists; in fact, ≥ is itself the
unique rationalization. However, this is not a nice rationalization since (0, 1) does
not have an optimum according to ≥. On the other hand, Theorem 2 guarantees
that there is a nice rationalization of the strict preference of A1 over B1 if we do
not require the rationalizing preference to extend ≥. And indeed it does: simply let
1  r for all r < 1, and for all r, r′ ∈ (0, 1) let r ∼ r′.
3.5 Strict menu preferences and strict rationalization
We now turn to the case in which D is trivial and T = S, so that the rationalizability





reduces to the following: there exists a preference
% on X such that for each t, there exists x ∈ At with x  Bt. This case is of
particular interest, as the procedure of iterated exclusion of dominated observations
ends in one round and the never-covered property has a much simpler form. To
wit, since T = S, for any nonempty T ′ ⊆ T , B(T ′ ∩ S) = B(T ′). Therefore, the
procedure of iterated exclusion of dominated observations reduces to the following:
for any nonempty T ′ ⊆ T ,
Φ1(T ′) =
{













t ∈ T ′ : At ⊆ B(T ′)
}
= Φ1(T ′).
Therefore, the set of dominated observations is Φ(T ′) = {t ∈ T ′ : At ⊆ B(T ′)}, and
the never-covered property Φ(T ′) 6= T ′ holds if and only if A(T ′) 6⊆ B(T ′).
We note that this special case of our result is (in its essentials) covered by
Fishburn (1976), who establishes that there is % such that xt ∈ At with xt  Bt for
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each t if and only if
A(T ′) 6⊆ B(T ′) for all nonempty T ′ ⊆ T . (2)
Following Fishburn, we shall refer to the property (2) as the partial congruence
axiom. In fact, Fishburn’s result is somewhat more general because it partially
covers the case in which T is infinite.12 We have confined our attention to the case
in which T is finite because it is the case most relevant to empirical applications
and it allows us to formulate an efficient algorithm for checking the never-covered
property.13
The following result summarizes our findings when menu preferences are strict.





where T = S, the following
statements are equivalent:
1. M is nicely rationalizable.
2. M is nicely rationalizable by a strict preference.
3. M satisfies the partial congruence axiom.
The equivalence of the first and second statements in this corollary is due to
Fishburn (1976, Lemma 1). As we have explained, the partial congruence axiom
and the never-covered property are equivalent when T = S and thus the equivalence
of the first and third statements follows from Theorem 2.
It almost goes without saying that when S is a strict subset of T (so that
there are some observations where rationalization only requires xt ∈ At such that
xt % Bt rather than xt  Bt), the partial congruence axiom no longer characterizes
rationalizable data sets and one needs to appeal to the never-covered property.
Indeed, consider the data set in Example 2; is it possible for At  Bt for all t? The
answer is ‘No’ because A(T ) = B(T ) and the partial congruence axiom is violated.
However, if we only require the relation in the first observation to be strict (as we
did in that example), then the data set is rationalizable because it satisfies the
(weaker) never-covered property.
12 Fishburn (1976) considers two separate cases. For the case in which T could be infinite but
At is required to be finite for each t, he shows that rationalizability is characterized by the partial
congruence axiom. When T is countable and At is allowed to be infinite, his characterization result
(Theorem 3) takes a different form, but it is equivalent to the partial congruence axiom when T is
finite. The case in which T is more than countable and At is infinite is not covered by his results
(or ours).
13 If T is infinite, then there is obviously no hope of any algorithm for checking rationalizability.
Fishburn’s paper (perhaps partly because of its emphasis on the case of infinite T ) does not discuss
algorithms for checking the partial congruence axiom.
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We now discuss the relationship between our work and the paper of de Clippel
and Rozen (forthcoming). We first describe the problem they solve using our
terminology. They assume that the preorder D is trivial. They consider finite data
sets where each observation t has the form ({Atj}j∈J(t), xt), where {Atj}j∈J(t) is a






admits an upper contour rationalization in the following sense:
there is a strict preference  such that, at each t, there is a set in the collection
{Atj}j∈J(t) that is contained in the upper contour of xt, i.e., there is Atj(t) in {Atj}j∈J(t)
such that Atj(t)  x.14
This problem and our menu rationalization problem have different economic
motivations; however, when X is finite (so that all the relevant subsets in both
problems are also finite), the two problems could be thought of as equivalent in the
sense that it is always possible to convert one problem into the other, which also
means that any algorithm developed for one could, in principle, be used to solve
the other. That said, it should be clear from the conversion procedure (outlined
in the Appendix) that there is no general computational reason for solving either
problem in this roundabout fashion, since the converted data set would typically
have more observations than the original data set. Thus, the two algorithms are
best understood as distinct and serving different purposes.
3.6 Menu preferences in Kreps (1979) and Tyson (2018)
Let X̂ ⊆ X be a nonempty collection of menus and let %M be a preference over X̂
(which means that %M is a reflexive, transitive, and complete binary relation on
X̂ ). Abusing our terminology somewhat, we say that a preference % on X nicely
rationalizes %M if, for all D ∈ X̂ , the set arg max(D; %) is nonempty and, for any
x′ ∈ arg max(D′; %) and x′′ ∈ arg max(D′′; %), we have x′ % x′′ if D′ %M D′′ and
x′  x′′ if D′ M D′′.
Tyson (2018) shows that a menu preference %M on X̂ is nicely rationalizable if
and only if it satisfies the cover dominance condition, as defined below.
Definition 5 (Tyson (2018)). A menu preference %M over X̂ satisfies the cover
dominance condition if for any A,D ∈ X̂ and {Bi}i∈I ⊆ X̂ ,
A M Bi for each i ∈ I and D ⊆ ∪i∈IBi ⇒ A M D.
14 A version of their algorithm is contained in the first working paper version of their paper; see
de Clippel and Rozen (2012).
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Furthermore, when X̂ is finite and closed under union, the cover dominance
condition can be equivalently stated in the following way.
Definition 6. Let X̂ be closed under union. A menu preference %M over X̂ is
Kreps-consistent if, for any A,B ∈ X , A %M B implies that A ∼M A ∪B.15
Hence, Tyson (2018) generalizes the result in Kreps (1979) which states that,
when X is finite, a menu preference on X (the set of all nonempty subsets of X) is
nicely rationalizable if and only if it is Kreps-consistent.
In our setup, it is assumed that M, a finite list of preference pairs between
menus At and Bt, is observed. Its key difference with Kreps (1979) and Tyson (2018)
is that these observations need not constitute a preference over all the menus in
X̂ = {At}t∈T ∪ {Bt}t∈T ; in other words, while we posit that it is known that At is
weakly preferred to Bt, we do not require the observer to know how At compares
with At′ or with Bt′ .
Provided that the collection of menus X̂ is finite, we could always construct a
finite set of menu preferencesM∗ from a preference %M on X̂ in the following way:
(At, Bt) ∈M∗ if and only if At %M Bt and t ∈ S if and only if At M Bt.
Clearly,M∗ is nicely rationalizable (in the sense of Definition 4) by a preference
% if and only if % nicely rationalizes the menu preference %M . By Theorem 2, the
nice rationalizability of %M is characterized by the never-covered property onM∗.
In particular, this means that one can efficiently check if %M is nicely rationalizable
by implementing our algorithm for checking the never-covered property. It also
follows immediately from Theorem 2 and the results in Tyson (2018) that, when X̂
is finite, the cover dominance condition on %M and the never-covered property on
M are equivalent; furthermore, if X̂ is also closed under union, then each of these
conditions is equivalent to Kreps-consistency.
3.7 Continuous rationalizability
When the space of alternatives X is infinite, it is helpful to endow it with a topology
and study continuous preferences. This guarantees (among other things) that the
preference generates an optimum choice on compact menus and that the optimum
varies continuously with the menu. For example, a continuous preference on the
consumption space Rn+ would guarantee that the demand correspondence is nonempty
15 We denote by ∼M the equivalence relation induced from %M .
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when prices are strictly positive (so that the budget set is compact) and varies
continuously with prices.16






by a continuous utility function u : X → R if u represents a preference % that
D-rationalizesM in the sense of Definition 1. Theorem 3 below provides conditions
under whichM can be rationalized by a continuous utility function.
Theorem 3. Suppose that X is a locally compact and separable metric space and




where Bt is compact for each t ∈ T , the following statements are
equivalent:
1. M is D-rationalizable.
2. M satisfies the never-covered property under D.
3. M is D-rationalized by a continuous utility function u.
Note that this theorem does not assume that At is a compact set. It does assume
that Bt is a compact set, which guarantees that for any continuous utility function
u, the set arg maxx∈Bt u(x) is nonempty. If, in addition, At is a compact set for all t,
then arg maxx∈At u(x) is also nonempty for all t and thusM is nicely D-rationalized
by a continuous utility function u ifM satisfies the never-covered property under D.
The following example illustrates the application of Theorem 3.
Example 4. Let X = Rn+ be the consumption space with n goods. To capture the
notion that a consumer strictly prefers more goods to less, we let the product order
≥ to be underlying preorder. Then utility function u extends ≥ if and only if it is
strictly increasing, in the sense that u(x′) > u(x) whenever x′ > x. The order ≥
is continuous in the Euclidean topology on Rn+. Suppose thatM =
{
(At, Bt)}t∈T ,
where At and Bt are compact sets; Theorem 3 guarantees that M can be nicely
rationalized by a strictly increasing and continuous utility function if and only if it
obeys the never-covered property under ≥.
There are other preorders besides the product order that could be natural in
this setting. For example, X = Rn+ could be the space of contingent consumption,
where the probabilities of each state are known (or part of the hypothesis). Then,
based on those probabilities, different bundles in X could be ranked according to
16 More generally, if we endow the collection of compact menus with the Hausdorff metric, then
the correspondence mapping a compact menu to its optima is well-defined and upper hemicontinous.
17 Terminology: a preorder % is continuous (or closed) if {(x, y) ∈ X ×X : x % y} is a closed
set in X ×X.
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the first order stochastic dominance, i.e., x ≥FSD y if x first order stochastically
dominates y. For example, suppose that the states are equiprobable; then x ≥FSD y
and y ≥FSD x if the entries in y is a permutation of those in x. In this case, a utility
function that extends ≥FSD is simply a utility function that is strictly increasing in
≥ and symmetric.
Obviously, ≥FSD is a finer order than ≥ in the sense that ≥⊂≥FSD. It is






and At and Bt are compact for all t; by Theorem 3,M satisfies
the never-covered property under ≥FSD if and only if it admits a nice rationalization
by a continuous utility function that extends ≥FSD.
Consider the example depicted in Figure 1(b), where K̂p is weakly preferred
to K̂q in observation 1 and K̂q is weakly preferred to K̂r in observation 2.
Since the never-covered property under ≥ is satisfied, these observations can be
rationalized by a continuous and strictly increasing utility function. However, they
are not rationalizable by a preference that extends ≥FSD when states 1 and 2 are
equiprobable. Notice that for every (a, b) ∈ K̂p, there is (a′, b′) ∈ K̂q such that either
(a′, b′) > (a, b) or (b′, a′) > (a, b)); thus K̂p ⊆ K̂q↓↓.18 In formal terms, Φ({1}) = {1},
so the never-covered property is violated.
4 Application: Revealed price preference
One of the major themes in classical consumer theory is the recovery of the utility
function from indirect utility. Formally, the question can be posed in the following
way. Let v : Rn++ → R be a function. What necessary and sufficient conditions on v
guarantee that
v(p) = max{u(x) : p · x ≤ 1}
for some function u : Rn+ → R (interpreted as the consumer’s utility function)? This
question has been thoroughly studied (see, for example, Krishna and Sonnenschein
(1990) and Jackson (1986)) and it is well-known that the distinctive property that v
necessarily satisfies is quasi-convexity.
Our objective in this section is to develop a finite analog of this question, in
the sense that instead of recovering u from the function v we ask what conditions
would allow us to recover a preference on the underlying bundles that are consistent
with a finite list of preferences over prices. Of course, the quick and short answer
18 From Figure 1(b), it is clear that K̂p is contained in the interior of K̂q ∪ (K̂q)′, where (K̂q)′
is the reflection of K̂q on the 45 degree line.
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to the issue before us is the never-covered property, but the additional structure of
the consumer problem, with linear budget sets in Euclidean space, allows us to say
more.
We work with a data set with T observations, where at each observation t, the
consumer reports either a weak or strong preference between two price vectors.
Following our convention, if t ∈ W , then the consumer weakly prefers the price
vector pt to qt. If t ∈ S, then the consumer strictly prefers the price vector pt to qt.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the income of the consumer to be 1, so that
the consumer’s budget set at price p ∈ Rn+ is
L(p) :=
{
x ∈ Rn+ : p · x ≤ 1
}
.
A preference for pt over qt means a preference for the budget L(pt) over L(qt). Thus






The next result is an application of Theorem 3 to this environment.






1. M can be rationalized by a locally nonsatiated preference on Rn+.19
2. M satisfies the never-covered property under the product order ≥.
3. M can be nicely rationalized by a strictly increasing, continuous, and concave
utility function u : Rn+ → R.
A straightforward application of Theorem 3 tells us thatM satisfies the never-
covered property under ≥ if and only if it can be rationalized by a strictly increasing
and continuous utility function. The latter statement is replaced in Theorem 4
by both a weaker statement (rationalization by a locally nonsatiated preference)
and a stronger statement (rationalization by a strictly increasing, continuous, and
concave utility function). A proof of this result is in the Appendix, but it is worth
noting the following here. In establishing that Statement (1) implies (2), we cannot
simply appeal to the argument in Section 3.1 because in that case we make the
assumption that the rationalizing preference % extends a preorder; however, the local
nonsatiation assumption on % in this context allows us to retrace that argument,
essentially because for any linear budget set L (assuming strictly positive prices),
L↓ = L and L↓↓ is the interior of L. As for the implication from (2) to (3), the
linearity of the budget sets is crucial in guaranteeing that the rationalizing utility
function can be chosen to be concave; our proof of that implication combines Theorem
19 Terminology: A preference % is locally nonsatiated if for every x ∈ Rn+ and every open
neighborhood N around x, there x′ ∈ N such that x′  x.
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3 with the Afriat’s Theorem (see Afriat (1967)) which guarantees rationalization
with a concave utility function.
We know from standard consumer theory that quasiconvexity plays a crucial
role in the characterization of indirect utility functions. The never-covered property
could be thought of as the finite analog to quasiconvexity. In the case in which all
the price preferences are strict, i.e., T = S, this connection is especially clear and is
presented in Corollary 2 below.
To motivate the characterizing condition in Corollary 2, suppose that M is
rationalized by a strictly increasing, continuous, and concave utility function u.
This implies that the indirect utility function v is strictly decreasing in prices
and quasiconvex. Given T ′ ⊆ T , suppose that v(pt∗) ≥ v(pt) for all t ∈ T ′ and
v(qs∗) ≥ v(qt) for all t ∈ T ′. Since T = S, v(ps∗) > v(qs∗). Since v is quasiconvex,





v(pt∗) ≥ v(ps∗) > v(qs∗) ≥ v(q)









. It turns out that this quasiconvex-like property is precisely
equivalent to the never-covered property.






where T = S, is rationalizable by a strictly increasing, continuous, and concave
utility function u : Rn+ → R if and only if the following property holds: for any
nonempty T ′ ⊆ T ,





The proof of this result, as well as its extension to the case in which W is
nonempty, can be found in the Appendix.
5 Application: Coarse rationalizability
So far in this paper, we have considered the rationalization of a set of menu preference
pairs. In this section, we discuss a formally related but economically distinct issue,
namely, the rationalization of choices from menus. Our contribution is to provide a
method for testing rationalizability in situations where observations are coarse, in a
sense we shall make specific. Among other things, we provide an extension of the
Afriat’s Theorem to this environment.
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5.1 Four concepts of rationalization
Suppose that at observation t, there is a menu Ct and a set At ⊆ Ct. Two notions
of rationalization are commonly used in analyses of this type. The first concept
requires a preference % such that At = max(Ct; %) for all t ∈ T ; the Richter’s
Theorem (see Richter (1966)) characterizes data sets which are rationalizable in this
sense. The second concept requires a preference % such that At ⊆ max(Ct; %)
for all t ∈ T ; the Afriat’s Theorem (and its generalizations to nonlinear domains)
characterize data sets that satisfy this concept of rationalization. Loosely speaking,
the first notion of rationalization is the one most commonly used in the theoretical
revealed preference literature; on the other hand, empirical work using revealed
preference has mostly relied on the second, weaker notion, which is unsurprising
since it does not posit that the observer has observed all the optimal choices, but
only one (or some) of them.
A third concept of rationalization has been characterized in Fishburn (1976),
where the set of optimal points is required to be contained in At; in other words,
max(Ct; %) ⊆ At. Obviously, Fishburn’s concept generalizes the one in Richter’s
Theorem by allowing some elements of At to be nonoptimal, but it retains the
requirement that nothing outside of At is optimal. This suggests that a fourth
concept of rationalization may be useful in empirical applications: one that allows
for the possibility that some elements in At are nonoptimal (following Fishburn)
and also that some elements outside of At are optimal (following Afriat). In formal
terms, it requires that max(Ct; %) ∩ At 6= ∅.
The revealed preference literature since the 1970s have by and large neglected
Fishburn’s rationalization concept and its corresponding result. We think that
Fishburn’s concept, as well as the relaxation of that concept which we just proposed,
deserves notice because they are relevant to empirical applications of revealed
preference.
These concepts are applicable whenever there are coarse observations, where the
observer knows (or hypothesizes) that there is an optimal choice found in At, but
is agnostic about precisely which alternatives within At are optimal. There are at
least three broad scenarios where it is useful to think of coarse observations.
(1) The most obvious cases are those where the observations are simply known to be
imprecise. For example, a researcher may have information on how much is spent
on broad categories of goods, without knowing the allocation within each category.
Alternatively, a researcher may have records on a consumer’s credit card purchases,
which puts a lower bound on how money is spent each month on different goods, but
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does not provide the precise breakdown of monthly expenditure since there could be
goods bought with cash.
(2) There could be situations where some alternative yt is recorded as the choice
from Ct but, in testing for rationality or estimating the preference, the researcher
may wish to accommodate the possibility that choices were observed with error;
this could be accomplished by defining a neighborhood At around yt (in some sense
appropriate to the specific context) and then checking if there is a preference % with
max(Ct; %) ∩ At 6= ∅ for all t ∈ T .
(3) In experimental settings, it is common to find subjects whose choice behavior are
not exactly consistent with rationality. Since the choices yt are typically observed
perfectly, it is implausible to attribute the rationality violations to observational
errors. However, one could still use the size of the neighborhood At (suitably
measured) as a way of comparing the rationality of different experimental subjects;
those who require large Ats to rationalize their behavior can be deemed less rational
than those where At is just a small neighborhood of yt.
5.2 Coarse data sets and menu preferences
We consider an observer who has a finite set of coarse observations of a decision






a partition of T and for each t ∈ T we have ∅ 6= At ⊆ Ct. The interpretation is as
follows. When t ∈ W , At contains at least one choice of the decision maker in Ct;
when t ∈ S, At contains all the choices of the decision maker in Ct. The observer
would like to recover a preference % that rationalizes the data in the following sense.





1. max(Ct; %) ∩ At 6= ∅ for each t ∈ W , and
2. max(Ct; %) ⊆ At for each t ∈ S.
If % exists, we say that O is rationalizable. If % can be chosen to rationalize O and
extend a given preorder D, then O is D-rationalizable.
Obviously, conditions (1) and (2) in this definition correspond precisely to the
fourth and third concepts of rationalization discussed in Section 5.1. Note that if
T = W , then every coarse data set is trivially rationalized by a preference that is
indifferent across all alternatives. So in the case, the rationalizability problem is
interesting only if the preference is required to be locally nonsatiated or to extend
some preorder D.
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Checking if a coarse data set is rationalizable is straightforward, given the results






, we could construct the following setM∗ of menu preference
pairs: the menu At is weakly preferred to the menu Ct for all t ∈ T and At is strictly
preferred to the menu Ct \ At for t ∈ S. Clearly,M∗ is rationalized by a preference
% if and only if the coarse data set O is rationalizable by the same preference %.
Thus every result we have on the rationalizability (or D-rationalizability) of the set
of menu preference pairsM∗ has an analog for O.
In the following subsection, we extend the Afriat’s Theorem to coarse data sets.
5.3 A generalization of Afriat’s theorem





where for each t ∈ T , pt ∈ Rn++ is
the price vector, yt is the total expenditure, and L(pt, yt) := {x ∈ Rn+ : pt · x ≤ yt}
is the budget set at observation t.20 Departing from the standard setting of Afriat’s
Theorem, the observer does not know the exact choice of the consumer and only
knows that the choice lies in At ⊆ L(pt). The following result provides us with a
test of coarse rationalizability in this setting.





be a coarse data set where T = W and
At ⊆ L(pt, yt) for all t ∈ T . The following statements are equivalent:
1. O can be rationalized by a locally nonsatiated preference.
2. O satisfies the never-covered property under the product order ≥.21
3. O can be rationalized by a strictly increasing, continuous, and concave utility
function.
Example 5. In studies of consumer demand, a researcher would often not have
information on the demand for every relevant good. A common way to address
this issue is to perform some aggregation procedure across goods, even though this
approach is strictly valid only under stringent conditions on the utility function
and/or the pattern of prices changes.
To be more specific, suppose that at observation t, the information available
consists of the prices of all goods pt ∈ Rn++, the demand for the first m− 1 goods,
and the total expenditure on the remaining goods (which we denote by ctm,n). In
20 Note that we departing from the convention and notation of the previous section by not
normalizing expenditure at 1. This presentation is more appropriate in this section to highlight
the fact that total expenditure yt is part of the observer’s data.
21 In this statement, we are interpreting O as a set of weak menu preferences.
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other words, the actual demand for goods m, m+ 1, . . . , n is not observed. To get
round this problem, the researcher could construct a price index for those goods, p̄tm,
which would be a function of their prices (ptm, ptm+1, . . . , ptn), with the corresponding
demand for the composite good being x̄tm = ctm,n/p̄tm. In this way, the researcher
creates a data set of the standard form, with prices (pt1, pt2, . . . , p̄tm) and demand
(xt1, xt2, . . . , x̄tm) for m goods at each observation.
Coarse data sets offer a potentially useful alternative approach to tackle this
problem. At observation t, the researcher observes xti for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 and ctm,n.
Thus the demand of the consumer must lie in the set
At = {x ∈ Rn+ : xi = xti for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 and
∑n
i=m pixi = ctm,n}.







ctm,n. This can be analyzed using Theorem 5.
As an illustration, suppose that O consists of two observations where
p1 = (2, 2.5, 3.5), x11 = 1.5, c12,3 = 9, y1 = 12
p2 = (4, 3, 3), x11 = 3, c12,3 = 4.5, y2 = 16.5.
This data set is coarse rationalizable. Indeed, the bundle x̃ = (1.5, 9/2.5, 0) is in
A1 but p2 · x̃ = 16.8 > 16.5, so it is not in L(p2, y2). Given that there are just two
observations, this is enough to guarantee that O satisfies the never-covered property
under ≥.
On the other hand, suppose we were to aggregate goods 2 and 3 into a composite
commodity, with the price of the composite good fixed at 3 at both observations 1 and
2. Then the demand for the composite good at these observations are x̄12 = 9/3 = 3
and x̄22 = 4.5/3 = 1.5. The corresponding two-good data set has
p1 = (2, 3), x1 = (1.5, 3), y1 = 12;
p2 = (4, 3), x2 = (3, 1.5) y2 = 16.5.
It is straightforward to check that this data set violates GARP and is not
rationalizable.
Example 6. Consider a researcher who observes that the consumer chooses the
bundle xt from the budget set L(pt, yt). To allow for the possibility that xt was











Figure 2: The data set {(x1, L1), (x2, L2)} is not rationalizable, but
{(A1, L1), (A2, L2)} (as depicted) is rationalizable.
be in the set
At = {x ∈ L(pt, yt) : pt · x = yt and |ptixi − ptixti| ≤ kyt for all i},
where k ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, the expenditure on good i is allowed to deviate
from ptixti but not by more than kyt. This is illustrated in Figure 2, where the
‘original’ data set {(x1, L1), (x2, L2)} is not rationalizable, but {(A1, L1), (A2, L2)}
(as depicted) is rationalizable. More generally, our extension of the Afriat’s Theorem






6 Application: Multiple preferences
In this section, we investigate the observable restrictions of the multiple preferences
model; see, for example, Aizerman and Malishevski (1981) and Salant and Rubinstein
(2008). In contrast with the single preference model, the choice behavior of the
DM may be a result of multiple rationales. Formally, the DM has a set Π of strict
preferences, and she chooses
fΠ(A) :=
{
x : x = max(A; ) for some ∈ Π
}
in each menu A.
We represent the observed choice behavior of the DM by a data set (Σ, f), where
Σ ⊆ X and f(A) is the collection of alternatives that the DM chooses in A ∈ Σ. We
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say that (Σ, f) is rationalizable by multiple preferences if there exists a set Π of
strict preferences such that
fΠ(A) = f(A)
for all A ∈ Σ. For notational simplicity, we denote by g(A) := A\f(A) the collection
of alternatives that are not chosen in A ∈ Σ. In what follows, we identify necessary
and sufficient conditions under which (Σ, f) is rationalizable by multiple preferences
by applying our results in Section 3.








where all menu preferences are strict. It is easy to see that if (Σ, f) is rationalizable
by multiple preferences, then there necessarily exists a strict preference  such that
max(A; ) ∈ f(A) for all A ∈ Σ. In other words, O must be rationalizable by a
strict preference. However, this is not sufficient for rationalizability by multiple
preferences, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 7 (A data set that is not rationalizable by multiple preferences). Let X =
{x, y, z}. Consider the data set (Σ, f) consisting of the following three observations:22
(1) f({x, y}) = x;
(2) f({y, z}) = y;
(3) f({x, y, z}) = {x, z}.
Consider the data set of menu preferences O =
{
(x, y), (y, z), ({x, z}, y)
}
. It
follows from Corollary 1 that O is rationalizable by a strict preference (for example,
by the strict preference x  y  z). However, (Σ, f) is not rationalizable by multiple
preferences. To see this, suppose to the contrary that (Σ, f) is rationalizable by
multiple preferences. By definition, there exists a set Π of strict preferences such
that fΠ(A) = f(A) for all A ∈ Σ. The first observation f({x, y}) = x reveals that
x  y for all ∈ Π, and the second observation f({y, z}) = y reveals that y  z for
all ∈ Π. By transitivity, it must be that x  z for all ∈ Π, which contradicts
with the third observation that f({x, y, z}) = {x, z}.
We now present a characterization of the multiple preferences model as follows. By






by a strict preference if and only if for all ∅ 6= Σ′ ⊆ Σ,
∪A∈Σ′ f(A) 6⊆ ∪A∈Σ′ g(A).
22 We abuse the notation by suppressing the set delimiters, e.g., writing x rather than {x}.
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As illustrated by Example 7, this is not sufficient. We strengthen this condition as
follows: for any nonempty Σ′ ⊆ Σ and B ∈ Σ,
(
∪A∈Σ′ f(A) \ ∪A∈Σ′ g(A)
)





To understand the condition, note that it is plainly a necessary condition. Indeed,
suppose that the data set is rationalizable by multiple preferences. If an alternative
is not chosen in A, then under each preference, it is dominated by some alternative
chosen in A. Hence, any alternative in g(A) is not chosen in a menu that contains
f(A). This implies that the set of choices made in ∪A∈Σ′ A does not contain any
alternative in ∪A∈Σ′ g(A). Furthermore, since f(A) contains all maximal alternatives
under each preference in A, choices made in ∪A∈Σ′ A should be a subset of ∪A∈Σ′ f(A),
and thus a subset of ∪A∈Σ′ f(A)\∪A∈Σ′ g(A). By a similar argument, any alternative
in ∪A∈Σ′ g(A) is not chosen in any menu containing ∪A∈Σ′ f(A) \ ∪A∈Σ′ g(A), as
stated by the condition. Theorem 6 shows that this new condition is both necessary
and sufficient for the rationalizability of a data set by multiple preferences.
From a practical perspective, we provide a divide-and-conquer approach to
test whether a give data set (Σ, f) is rationalizable by multiple preferences.
Rationalizability by multiple preferences requires that for each A ∈ Σ and x ∈ f(A),
there exist a strict preference such that x is the maximal element in A according to
this strict preference. Furthermore, the maximal element in any other set A′ ∈ Σ
according to this strict preference must lie in f(A′). Thus, for each A ∈ Σ and
x ∈ f(A), the following data set of menu preferences
OA,x := (x,A \ x) ∪
{




where all menu preferences are strict, must be rationalizable by a strict preference.
Let
D := {OA,x}A∈Σ, x∈f(A).
A necessary condition for the data set (Σ, f) to be rationalizable by multiple
preferences is that each OA,x in D is rationalizable by a strict preference. Theorem
6 below shows that the converse is also true. Recall that it is straightforward to
check whether a data set of menu preferences is rationalizable by a strict preference
23 To see that this is a strengthening of the previous condition, suppose that there exists
some nonempty Σ′ ⊆ Σ such that ∪A∈Σ′ f(A) ⊆ ∪A∈Σ′ g(A). Fix an arbitrary nonempty set





= ∅. We have arrived at a contradiction, since f(B) ⊆ ∪A∈Σ′ f(A) ⊆
∪A∈Σ′ g(A).
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(see Section 3.3). Thus, it is straightforward to check whether a data set (Σ, f) is
rationalizable by multiple preferences using the divide-and-conquer approach.
Theorem 6. The following statements are equivalent:
(1) (Σ, f) is rationalizable by multiple preferences.
(2) For any nonempty Σ′ ⊆ Σ and B ∈ Σ,
(
∪A∈Σ′ f(A) \ ∪A∈Σ′ g(A)
)





(3) Each OA,x in D is rationalizable by a strict preference.
Theorem 6 holds for any data set (Σ, f). In the special case of complete data,
that is, when Σ = X , Aizerman and Malishevski (1981) show that the multiple
preferences model could be characterized by the following two axioms:
Chernoff : A ⊆ B ⇒ f(B) ∩ A ⊆ f(A) for all A,B ∈ X .
Aizerman: f(B) ⊆ A ⊆ B ⇒ f(A) ⊆ f(B) for all A,B ∈ X .
In words, the Chernoff axiom says that a best choice in some set is still best if the
set shrinks. The Aizerman axiom says that deleting from a given set some choices
outside the choice set cannot make new choices chosen. We establish this result
as a corollary of Theorem 6 by showing that our characterization for any data set
(complete or incomplete) follows from the Chernoff axiom and the Aizerman axiom
in the case of complete data.
Corollary 3 (Aizerman and Malishevski (1981)). The data set (X , f) is rational-
izable by multiple preferences if and only if it satisfies the Chernoff axiom and the
Aizerman axiom.
7 Application: Minimax regret
The decision criterion of minimax regret is first suggested in Savage (1951)’s reading
of Wald (1950) to model a DM who anticipates regret and thus incorporates in her
choice the desire to minimize the worst-case regret. In this section, we investigate
the observable restrictions of the minimax regret model by applying our results in
Section 3.
We adopt the standard framework of the state space that has been discussed by,
for example, Kreps (1979) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001). We consider
any nonempty finite set X. Let U denote a state space with a typical element u.
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To economize on notation, we also write u to denote the utility function of the DM
associated with the state u. The regret of choosing x relative to y is u(y)− u(x) if
the state is u, the worst-case regret of choosing x relative to y is










The DM who uses the minimax regret decision criterion chooses all alternatives that
generate the lowest worst-case regret. That is, the DM chooses







in each menu A.24
We represent the observed choice behavior of the DM by (Σ, f), where Σ ⊆ X
and f(A) is the choice of the DM in A ∈ Σ. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that f is a choice function.25 We say that (Σ, f) is rationalizable under the minimax
regret model if there exists a finite set U of utility functions such that








for all A ∈ Σ.
Given the flexibility to construct the set of utility functions, the readers might
wonder, whether there are any observable restrictions of the minimax regret model.
To get this out of the way, let us first present a data set (Σ, f) that is not rationalizable
under the minimax regret model. We shall also use this data set in Example 8
(Continued) to illustrate the approach that we establish in this section.
Example 8 (A data set that is not rationalizable under the minimax regret model).
Let X = {x, y, z, w}. Consider a data set (Σ, f) consisting of the following three
observations: f(X) = x, f(X \ z) = y, and f(X \ w) = y.
24 Our minimax regret model differs from that in Milnor (1954) and Stoye (2011), who axiomatize






u ◦ g(s)− u ◦ f(s)
}
,
where f and g are acts in a menu M , S is a state space, and u is an expected utility functional.
25 The case of a choice correspondence can be accommodated using similar logic.
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Suppose that (Σ, f) is rationalizable under the minimax regret model, say, by
the set U of utility functions. In what follows, we show that (1) f(X) = x and
f(X \ z) = y imply that φU(y, z) > φU(y, w); and (2) f(X) = x and f(X \ w) = y
imply that φU(y, w) > φU(y, z). Thus, we have a contradiction. Since f(X) = x, x
generates a lower worst-case regret in X than y does. It follows that the worst-case
regret of x in X \ z is lower than the worst-case regret of y in X. Since f(X \ z) = y,
the worst-case regret of y in X \ z is lower than the worst-case regret of x in X \ z.
Therefore, the worst-case regret of y in X and X \ z are not the same. This is
possible only if the worst-case regret of y relative to z is higher than the worst-case
regret of y relative to w. Similarly, since f(X) = x and f(X \ w) = y, we can
conclude that the worst-case regret of y relative to w is higher than the worst-case
regret of y relative to z.
We present a lemma that simplifies our analysis below. This lemma shows that,
without loss of generality, we can work with the following choice function:








for all A ∈ Σ. The proof is trivial and purely algebraic, and hence omitted.
Lemma 1. There exists a finite set U of utility function such that (3) holds for all
A ∈ Σ if and only if (4) holds for all A ∈ Σ under the same U .
By Lemma 1, the rationalizability of a data set (Σ, f) under the minimax regret
model is equivalent to the existence of a finite set U of utility functions such that
max
y∈A\f(A)
φU(f(A), y) < max
y∈A\x
φU(x, y)
for all A ∈ Σ and x ∈ A\f(A). For notational simplicity, throughout the rest of this
section, we shall write (x, y) rather than φU (x, y) to denote the worst-case regret of
x relative to y. This should not cause any confusion.
Interestingly, the rationalizability of a data set under the minimax regret model
is related to menu preferences. For any (Σ, f), we construct its corresponding data
set Ō as follows: for each A ∈ Σ and x ∈ A with x 6= f(A), let (Ai, Bi) ∈ Ō where
Āi = x× (A \ x) and B̄i = f(A)× (A \ f(A)).
The interpretation of the data point (Āi, B̄i) is that the menu Āi is strictly better
than B̄i in the numeric order, which captures that alternative x which is not chosen
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in A generates a higher worst-case regret in A than f(A) does. Theorem 7 below
makes the formal link between the rationalizability of a data set under the minimax
regret model and the rationalizability of menu preferences.
Theorem 7. The data set (Σ, f) is rationalizable under the minimax regret model
if and only if the corresponding data set Ō is rationalizable by a strict preference.
Recall that it is straightforward to check whether a data set of menu preferences
is rationalizable by a strict preference (see Section 3.3). Thus, it is straightforward
to check whether a data set (Σ, f) is rationalizable under the minimax regret model.
We now revisit Example 8 to illustrate how to use Theorem 7 to show that the data
set is not rationalizable under the minimax regret model.
Example 8 (Continued). We construct the corresponding data set Ō as follows:
Ā1 =
{


























































(y, x), (y, z)
}
.
By Corollary 1, Ō is not rationalizable by a strict preference. In particular,(




B̄1 ∪ B̄4 ∪ B̄6
)
. By Theorem 7, (Σ, f) is not rationalizable under
the minimax regret model.
A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. We have argued in the main text that Statement 1 implies
Statement 2. In what follows, we show that Statement 2 implies Statement 3 and
that Statement 3 implies Statement 1.
(Statement 2 ⇒ Statement 3) Suppose that M satisfies the never-covered
property under D. We shall explicitly provide a way of selecting xt in At for
each t ∈ T such that {xt}t∈T is a no-cycling selection under D.
For ease of notation, let us denote by E(T ′) the set of alternatives that are
revealed to be dominated through the procedure of iterated exclusion of dominated
33
observations, i.e.,
E(T ′) := B (T ′)↓↓
⋃
B ((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φ(T ′))↓ .
SinceM satisfies the never-covered property under D, for any nonempty T ′ ⊆ T ,
Φ(T ′) is strict subset of T ′, which implies that A (T ′) \ E(T ′) 6= ∅.
Let T1 := T and S1 := A(T1) \ E(T1). We proceed by induction. Suppose that
we have constructed Tk and Sk for some k ≥ 1. If Tk 6= ∅, we construct Tk+1 and
Sk+1 as follows:
Tk+1 := Φ(Tk) = {t ∈ Tk : At ⊆ E(Tk)}, and
Sk+1 := A(Tk+1) \ E(Tk+1).
SinceM satisfies the never-covered property under D, if Tk 6= ∅, then Tk+1 = Φ(Tk)
is a strict subset of Tk and Sk = A(Tk) \ E(Tk) 6= ∅. The construction stops when
Tk∗ 6= ∅ and Tk∗+1 = ∅ for some k∗.
We are now ready to select xt in At for each t ∈ T such that {xt}t∈T is a no-cycling
selection under D. For each 1 ≤ k ≤ k∗, let Vk := Tk \ Tk+1 denote the collection of
observations that are eliminated when constructing Tk+1 from Tk. Clearly, {Vk}k
∗
k=1
is a partition of T . By definition, for each k and each t ∈ Vk = Tk \ Tk+1, we have
At \ E(Tk) 6= ∅ and hence At ∩ Sk = At ∩ (A(Tk) \ E(Tk)) 6= ∅.
For each k and each t ∈ Vk = Tk \ Tk+1, we pick an arbitrary xt ∈ At ∩ Sk.
We proceed to verify that the revealed preference relations defined on {xt}t∈T
obey the no-cycling property. Let k(t) be the corresponding index k such that
t ∈ Vk. It suffices to show that (1) xtRxt
′ implies that k(t) ≤ k(t′); and (2)
xtPxt
′ implies that k(t) < k(t′). Suppose that xtRxt′ but k(t) > k(t′). Then
t ∈ Φ(Tk(t′)) due to the construction of {Vk}k
∗
k=1. It follows that At ⊆ E(Tk(t′)) and
Bt
↓ ⊆ E(Tk(t′)). Since xtRxt
′ , we have xt′ ∈ Bt↓ ⊆ E(Tk(t′)), which contradicts with
xt
′ ∈ Sk(t′) = A(Tk(t′)) \ E(Tk(t′)). Hence, xtRxt
′ implies k(t) ≤ k(t′). Suppose that
xtPxt
′ but k(t) ≥ k(t′). If k(t) > k(t′), then we have the same contradiction as
argue above. If k(t) = k(t′) = k for some k, then both xt and xt′ belong to Sk. Since
Sk = A(Tk) \ E(Tk) and B(Tk)↓↓ ∪B(Tk ∩ S)↓ ⊆ E(Tk), we have
xt, xt
′ ∈ Sk ⊆ A(Tk) \
(
B(Tk)↓↓ ∪B(Tk ∩ S)↓
)
.
But this is impossible since xtPxt′ implies that either xt′ ∈ Bt↓↓ or t ∈ S and
xt
′ ∈ Bt↓. Hence, xtPxt′ implies k(t) < k(t′).
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(Statement 3 ⇒ Statement 1) Suppose that M admits a no-cycling selection
under D, {xt}t∈T . Let R∗ be the binary relation on X where x̂ R∗ ŷ if there is t ∈ T
such that x̂ = xt and ŷ ∈ Bt. Let %∗ be the transitive closure of the binary relation
R∗ ∪ D. By the Szpilrajn’s extension theorem (see Szpilrajn (1930)), %∗ admits an
extension %.26
We claim that the preference % has two properties: (1) it rationalizes the data set
and (2) it extends D. It follows from the construction that xt % Bt for all t ∈ T , so
it remains to show that xt  Bt for t ∈ S. To show (1), suppose to the contrary that
for some t′ ∈ S, xt′ ∼ y for some y ∈ Bt′ . Given that % extends %∗, this can only
occur if y %∗ xt′ . This means there is t′′ ∈ T such that y D xt′′ %∗ xt′ . Therefore we
obtain xt′ P xt′′ %∗ xt′ , which is excluded by the no-cycling property. This completes
the proof of (1). To show (2), note that x % y if x D y by construction, so it remains
to show that x  y if xBy. Suppose instead we have xBy but x ∼ y. This can only
occur if y %∗ x. Since D is a preorder, if xB y and y %∗ x, there must be t′, t′′ ∈ T




′′ , which is incompatible with xt′′ % xt′ , given the no-cycling property.
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove the first statement below. The second
statement is an immediate implication of the first statement. Fix a nonempty
T ′ ⊆ T and Φ ( T ′ such that for any t ∈ T ′ \ Φ,
At 6⊆ B(T ′)↓↓
⋃
B((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φ)↓.
To show that Φ(T ′) ⊆ Φ, we proceed by induction. Obviously,
Φ0(T ′) = ∅ ⊆ Φ,
Φ1(T ′) =
{
t ∈ T ′ : At ⊆ B(T ′)↓↓
⋃
B(T ′ ∩ S)↓
}
⊆ Φ.
Suppose that we have Φm(T ′) ⊆ Φ for some m. It follows that
B(T ′)↓↓
⋃
B((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φm(T ′))↓ ⊆ B(T ′)↓↓
⋃
B((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φ)↓.
Thus, t ∈ T ′ \Φ implies t ∈ T ′ \Φm+1(T ′), which further implies that Φm+1(T ′) ⊆ Φ.
By induction, we have Φ(T ′) ⊆ Φ.
Proof of Proposition 2. By Theorem 1,M is D-rationalizable if and only if it
satisfies the never-covered property under D. Thus, it suffices to show that M
26 This means that there is a complete preorder % such that x % y if x %∗ y and x  y if x ∗ y
where  is the asymmetric part of % and ∗ the asymmetric part of %∗.
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satisfies the never-covered property under D if and only if the Algorithm outputs
D-Rationalizable.
(The only if-part) If M satisfies the never-covered property under D, then
Φ(T ′) 6= T ′ for any nonempty T ′ ⊆ T . Thus, Case (c) never occurs when we run
the Algorithm on this data set. Furthermore, T k is strictly decreasing in k in the
set inclusion sense, and T k∗ = ∅ for some k∗. Therefore, the Algorithm outputs
D-Rationalizable.
(The if-part) Conversely, suppose that the Algorithm outputs D-Rationalizable.
We then have a sequence of subsets of T , {T 0, T 1, . . . , T k∗}, where T k = Φ(T k−1) (
T k−1 for all k = 1, 2, . . . , k∗ and T k∗ = ∅. For any nonempty T ′ ⊆ T , there exists
some k such that T ′ ⊆ T k and T ′ 6⊆ T k+1. It is straightforward to verify that
the operator Φ(·) is monotonically increasing in the set inclusion sense. As such,
Φ(T ′) ⊆ Φ(T k) = T k+1. Since T ′ 6⊆ T k+1, we have Φ(T ′) 6= T ′. Thus, the data set
satisfies the never-covered property under D.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Theorem 1, Statements (1) and (2) are equivalent, and
obviously (3) implies (1). So it remains to show that (2) implies (3).

























where all the added observations are considered weak preferences. Notice thatM is
nicely rationalizable if and only ifM∗ is rationalizable.
We denote a typical observation of M∗ by z; the observation z may be in






satisfies the never-covered property, i.e., for any T ′ ⊆ T , the set
of dominated observations at T ′, Φ(T ′), satisfies Φ(T ′) 6= T ′. We claim that this
implies thatM∗ also satisfies the never-covered property, which will guarantee (by
Theorem 1) thatM∗ is rationalizable.
Given Z ′, a nonempty subset of Z, we denote its dominated observations by
Φ∗(Z ′). We need to show that Φ∗(Z ′) 6= Z ′. Suppose that Z ′ ∩ S = ∅, where S ⊆ T
is the set of observations with strict preferences. Then Φ∗(Z ′) = ∅ and so obviously
Φ∗(Z ′) 6= Z ′. Now suppose that Z ′ ∩ S is nonempty, which means that Z ′ ∩ T is
also nonempty. SinceM satisfies the never-covered property, (Z ′ ∩ T ) \Φ(Z ′ ∩ T ) is
nonempty. It is straightforward to check in this case that if t̂ ∈ (Z ′ ∩ T ) \Φ(Z ′ ∩ T )
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then t̂ ∈ Z ′ \ Φ∗(Z ′). Therefore, Z ′ \ Φ∗(Z ′) is nonempty since (Z ′ ∩ T ) \ Φ(Z ′ ∩ T )
is nonempty. We conclude thatM∗ satisfies the never-covered property.
Menu preference rationalization and upper contour rationalization. It is
straightforward to check that menu A is strictly preferred to menu B if and only if




for each x ∈ B.
For example, {x, y} is strictly preferred to {z, w} if and only if there is an upper
contour rationalization of the observations ({{x}, {y}}, z) and ({{x}, {y}}, w).
Conversely, suppose we wish to guarantee that there is a set in the collection
{Aj}j∈J that is contained in the upper contour set of x; this is equivalent to a




for each ∪j∈J {yj} where yi ∈ Aj for all j ∈ J.
For example, either {x, y} or {z} is in the upper contour set of w if and only if there
is a rationalization of the following menu preferences: {x, z} is preferred to {w} and
{y, z} is preferred to {w}.
Thus, it is always possible to convert an upper contour rationalization problem
into a menu preference rationalization problem and vice versa when X is finite
(but not when it is infinite) and any algorithm developed for one problem could,
in principle, be used to solve the other. However, it should also be clear from the
conversion procedure we outlined above that there is no general reason for solving
either problem in this roundabout fashion, since the converted data set would have
more (and in some case many more) observations than the original data set. The
two algorithms are best understood as distinct and serving different purposes.
Proof of Theorem 3. The equivalence of Statements (1) and (2) follows from
Theorem 1 and obviously (3) implies (1). It suffices to show that Statement (2)
implies (3). By Theorem 1, sinceM satisfies the never-covered property under D,
it admits a no-cycling selection {xt}t∈T under D. From the proof of Theorem 1,
we know that any preference that extends tran(R∗∪ D) (the transitive closure of
R∗∪ D) will rationalize the data and extend D. It remains to show that there is a
preference representable by a continuous utility function that extends tran(R∗∪ D).
By Levin’s Theorem, such an extension exists so long as tran(R∗∪ D) is a closed
preorder. That is indeed the case (see the proof of this claim contained in the
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proof of Theorem 2 in Nishimura, OK, and Quah (2017)) and it follows from the
compactness of Bt for all t ∈ T and the finite number of observations.
Proof of Theorem 4. Statement (3) obviously implies (1). To show that (1)
implies (2), suppose thatM is rationalized by a locally nonsatiated preference %
and xt ∈ L(pt) satisfies xt % L(qt) for all t ∈ T and xt  L(qt) for all t ∈ S. Let
x̂ = max({xt}t∈T ′ ; %). Denoting Lp(T ′) =
⋃
t∈T ′ L(pt) and Lq(T ′) in an analogous
fashion, we note that Lp(T ′) cannot be covered by Lq(T ′)↓↓
⋃
Lq(T ′ ∩ S)↓ since the
former contains x̂ and the latter does not. Indeed, x̂  Lq(T ′ ∩ S)↓ = Lq(T ′ ∩ S),
and so x̂ is not in Lq(T ′ ∩ S). Nor can x̂ be in Lq(T ′)↓↓ = Lq(T ′)o (the interior of
Lq(T ′)) because x̂ % Lq(T ′) and the preference is locally nonsatiated. Taking it one
step further, we know that x̂ is not in Lq(T ′)o
⋃
Lq((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φ1(T ′)), where
Φ1(T ′) :=
{
t ∈ T ′ : L(pt) ⊆ Lq(T ′)↓↓
⋃




t ∈ T ′ : L(pt) ⊆ Lq(T ′)o
⋃
Lq(T ′ ∩ S)
}
.
This is because x̂  Lq((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φ1(T ′)). Repeating this argument, we eventually
conclude that x̂ is in A(T ′) but not in Lq(T ′)o
⋃
Lq((T ′ ∩ S) ∪ Φ(T ′)) and hence
Φ(T ′) 6= T ′.
To show that (2) implies (3), note that Theorem 3 guarantees that there is a
strictly increasing and continuous utility function u : Rn+ → R that rationalizes
M. So it suffices to show that there is a utility function û that also rationalizes
M, which has the additional property of concavity. Each budget, L(pt) is compact
and so it has an optimum under u which we denote by xt (if there are multiple
optimal alternatives we may pick any one of them); similarly we denote the optimum
bundle in L(qt) by yt. Since u is strictly increasing, pt · x̄t = qt · yt = 1, i.e., the
optimal bundle is on the budget plane and not just the budget set. Let % denote the
preference (i.e, the complete preorder) over {xt}t∈T ∪ {yt}t∈T induced by u. Since it
is generated by u, the notional data set N = {(xt, pt)}t∈T ∪ {(yt, qt)}t∈T is cyclically
consistent in the sense of Afriat (1967) (equivalently, obeys the generalized axiom of
revealed preference in the sense of Varian (1982)). The preference % is a completion
of the revealed preference relations generated by N and defined on {xt}t∈T ∪{yt}t∈T ;
by the Afriat’s Theorem, there is a strictly increasing, continuous and concave utility
function û such that û(xt) ≥ û(x) for all x ∈ L(pt), û(yt) ≥ û(x) for all x ∈ L(qt),
and û(xt) ≥ (>)u(yt) if xt % () yt (where  is the asymmetric part of %). Thus
û also rationalizesM.














pt ≥ q. Then for any x ∈ L(pt), we have pt · x ≥ q · x, which implies pt · x ≥ qt′ · x
for some t′ ∈ T ′. Thus, x ∈ ⋃s∈T ′ L(qs). Since this is true for all any x ∈ L(pt), we
have L(pt) ⊆ ⋃s∈T ′ L(qs).
(The if-part) Fix some nonempty T ′ ⊆ T . Let
Q :=
{





Clearly, Q is closed and convex. Since there exists some t ∈ T ′ such that pt /∈ Q, by
the Hyperplane Separating Theorem, there exists a vector r ∈ Rn and a number b
where r 6= 0 such that pt · r = b < q · r for any q ∈ Q. It is easy to verify that r ≥ 0.
Since r 6= 0, we have b = pt · r > 0. Let r′ = r
b
. We have pt · r′ = 1 < q · r′ for all
q ∈ Q. In words, r′ is affordable under the price vectore pt but not under any qs.
Therefore, L(pt) 6⊆ ⋃s∈T ′ L(qs).
The next result extends Corollary 2 to the case in which weak preference between
prices are observed, i.e., where W can be nonempty.






The data setM is rationalizable by a strictly increasing, continuous, and concave
utility function u : Rn+ → R if and only if the following property holds: for any
nonempty T ′ ⊆ T ,
there exists Φ ( T ′ and ε 0 such that p 6≥ q whenever p pt for some
t ∈ T ′ \ Φ and q ∈ conv
(
{qs}s∈T ′
⋃{qr − ε}r∈Φ∪(T ′∩S)).27
Proof of Corollary 4. By Theorem 4, it suffices to show that M satisfies the
never-covered property under ≥ if and only if the property in Corollary 4 holds.
The never-covered property under ≥ requires that for any nonempty T ′ ⊆ T ,









We first prove the following lemma.
27 When T = S, the characterizing condition in this corollary reduces to that in Corollary 2.
To see this, note that if T ′ ∩ S = T ′, then the condition in Corollary 4 is equivalent to saying





{qr − ε}r∈T ′
)
, p 6≥ q. By continuity, this is equivalent to the condition in
Corollary 2.
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if and only if there exists some
ε 0 such that for any p̂ p, L(p̂) 6⊆
(⋃n


















. Fix such an x. Since
x ∈ L(p), for any p̂  p, there exists some δ  0 such that x + δ ∈ L(p̂). Fix
such a δ. Since x /∈ ⋃ns=1 L(qs), there exists some sufficiently small ε  0 such
that x /∈ ⋃ns=1 L(qs − ε), which further implies that x + δ /∈ ⋃ns=1 L(qs − ε). Since
x /∈ ⋃mr=1 L(qr)o, x + δ /∈ ⋃mr=1 L(qr). Since x + δ is contained in L(p̂) but not in(⋃n




, we have L(p̂) 6⊆
(⋃n












. Clearly, for each θ ∈ (12 , 1), θp p, and there exists x
θ ∈ L(θp)
such that xθ 6∈
(⋃n




. Note that {xθ}θ∈( 12 ,1) ∈ L(
1
2p),
which is compact. Therefore, {xθ}θ∈( 12 ,1) has a convergent subsequence. Let x





, otherwise x ∈ L(qs − ε)o for some s, which implies that

















It is easy to see that L(p̂) 6⊆
(⋃n




if and only if for
all q ∈ conv
(
{qs − ε}ns=1
⋃{qr}mr=1), p̂ 6≥ q (using similar argument as in the proof of
the if-part of Corollary 2). The desired result then follows from this and Proposition
1.
Proof of Theorem 5. We skip the proof that Statement (1) implies (2), which
is straightforward and similar to the argument given in Section 4 for the claim
that (1) implies (2) in Theorem 4. It is also obvious that (3) implies (1). So it
remains for us to show that (2) implies (3). An appeal to Theorem 3 guarantees that
there is xt (for each t ∈ T ) and a strictly increasing and continuous utility function






must satisfy cyclical consistency (equivalently GARP). By Afriat’s
Theorem, there is a strictly increasing, continuous, and concave utility function u
such that u(xt) ≥ u(x) for all x ∈ L(pt) for all t ∈ T .
Proof of Theorem 6. Statement (1)⇒ Statement (2): Suppose that the data set
(Σ, f) is rationalizable by multiple preferences. Fix an arbitrary nonempty Σ′ ⊆ Σ
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⊆ ∪A∈Σ′ A \ ∪A∈Σ′ g(A)
= ∪A∈Σ′ (f(A) ∪ g(A)) \ ∪A∈Σ′ g(A)




























Statement (2) ⇒ Statement (3): We show that for each A ∈ Σ and x ∈ f(A),
the data set OA,x is rationalizable by a strict preference. Suppose to the contrary,
for some A ∈ Σ and x ∈ f(A), the data set OA,x is not rationalizable by a strict
preference. By Corollary 1, there exists some nonempty Σ′ ⊆ Σ such that
∪B∈Σ′ fA,x(B) ⊆ ∪B∈Σ′ gA,x(B). (5)
Recall that in the main text, we show that the second statement implies that the





is rationalizable by a strict preference. By Corollary
1,
∪B∈Σ′ f(B) 6⊆ ∪B∈Σ′ g(B.)
Since O and OA,x only differ when the menu is A, we can conclude that A ∈ Σ′. Let





is rationalizable by a strict preference,
by Corollary 1, we have
∪B∈Σ′′ fA,x(B) 6⊆ ∪B∈Σ′′ gA,x(B). (6)
It follows from (5) and (6) that
(
∪B∈Σ′′ fA,x(B) \ ∪B∈Σ′′ gA,x(B)
)
⊆ gA,x(A) ⊆ A




. Since O and OA,x





We arrive at a contradiction.
Statement (3) ⇒ Statement (1): Suppose that for any A ∈ Σ and x ∈ f(A),
OA,x is rationalizable by a strict preference. Let A,x denote a strict preference
that rationalizes OA,x. By definition, max(A; A,x) = x ∈ f(A) and max(A′; A,x
) ∈ f(A′) for any A′ ∈ Σ and A′ 6= A. We claim that the set of strict preferences
41




for all A′ ∈ Σ. This follows immediately from the construction of the set of strict
preferences, since for each A′ ∈ Σ, (1) each element y in f(A′) is the maximal element
in A′ according to the strict preference A′,y; and (2) for any strict preference  in
{A,x}A∈Σ, x∈f(A), the maximal element in A′ according to  lies in f(A′).
Proof of Corollary 3. The only if-part is trivial. We only prove the if-part below.
We show that the second statement in Theorem 6 follows from the Chernoff axiom
and the Aizerman axiom.










⊆ A, the Aizerman axiom implies that f(f(A)∪x) ⊆ f(A).
Thus, f(f(A) ∪ x) = f(A).
Claim 2. For any A,B ∈ X , if f(A) ⊆ B, then f(B) ∩ g(A) = ∅.




. Since x ∈ g(A), by Claim
1, x is not chosen in f(A) ∪ x. The Chernoff axiom implies that x is not chosen in
any superset of f(A) ∪ x. In particular, x /∈ f(B). We have a contradiction.
Claim 3. For any nonempty X ′ ⊆ X and B ∈ X , if
(



























⊆ ∪A∈X ′ A \ ∪A∈X ′ g(A)
= ∪A∈X ′ (f(A) ∪ g(A)) \ ∪A∈X ′ g(A)
= ∪A∈X ′ f(A) \ ∪A∈X ′ g(A).
Thus, if
(
∪A∈X ′ f(A)\∪A∈X ′ g(A)
)














By Theorem 6, the data set is rationalizable by multiple preferences.
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Proof of Theorem 7. Let X̄ :=
{
(x, y) ∈ X ×X : x 6= y
}
.
(The only if-part) Suppose that the data set (Σ, f) is rationalizable under the




φU(f(A), y) < max
y∈A\x
φU(x, y)
for all A ∈ Σ and x ∈ A \ f(A). Since X is finite and these inequalities are strict,
there exists a finite set U ′ of utility functions such that
max
y∈A\f(A)
φU ′(f(A), y) < max
y∈A\x
φU ′(x, y)
for all A ∈ Σ and x ∈ A \ f(A), and φU ′(x, y) = φU ′(z, w) only if (x, y) = (z, w).
Define a strict partial order P such that (x, y)P (z, w) if and only if φU ′(x, y) >
φU ′(z, w). It follows from the Szpilrajn’s extension theorem that we can extend P
to a strict preference . It is straightforward to verify that Ō can be rationalized
by the strict preference .
(The if-part) Suppose that Ō is rationalizable by a strict preference, say . It
suffices to show that there exists a finite set U of utility functions such that for any
(x, y), (z, w) ∈ X̄, φU(x, y) > φU(z, w) if and only if (x, y)  (z, w).
Since X̄ is finite, we can construct a function β : X̄ → (1, 2) such that β(x, y) >
β(z, w) if and only if (x, y)  (z, w). We now construct a finite set of utility functions
U = {ux,y}(x,y)∈X̄ ,
where the utility functions are indexed by (x, y) ∈ X̄. For each (x, y) ∈ X̄, let
ux,y(z) =

0, if z = x;
β(x, y), if z = y;
β(x,y)
2 , otherwise.
Obviously, ux,y(y) − ux,y(x) = β(x, y) > 1. We claim that uz,w(y) − uz,w(x) < 1
if (z, w) 6= (x, y). First consider the case in which w 6= y. It follows from the
construction of the utility functions and the β function that
uz,w(y)− uz,w(x) ≤ uz,w(y) ≤
β(z, w)
2 < 1.
Next, we consider the case in which w = y. Since (z, w) 6= (x, y), we have z 6= x. By
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the construction of the utility functions,





Therefore, we can conclude that





= ux,y(y)− ux,y(x) = β(x, y).
We have constructed a finite set U of utility functions such that for any (x, y), (z, w) ∈
X̄,
φU(x, y) > φU(z, w) ⇐⇒ β(x, y) > β(z, w) ⇐⇒ (x, y)  (z, w).
This completes the proof of the if-part.
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